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Planning for transport in the wake of Stern and Eddington 
 
Abstract 
The recent Stern and Eddington reports for the UK Treasury emphasise the significance 
of the linkages between transport, landuse, the environment and the economy. Against 
that background, the purpose of this paper is to consider the future of transport planning 
in England given the liberalising thrust of the Barker Review on land use planning and 
the subsequent White Paper Planning for a Sustainable Future. In reviewing the 
demographic and economic assumptions of the White Paper, we conclude that in 
certain respects there are important mismatches between the emerging government 
policy on strategic planning and the Stern and Eddington Reports. 
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Planning for transport in the wake of Stern and Eddington 
 
Introduction 
Two independent reviews for HM Treasury published in late 2006, the Stern Review on 
the Economics of Climate Change and the Eddington Transport Study respectively, 
significantly shifted the terms of the transport policy debate. Stern negotiated a path 
through the often-heated exchanges on the economic impacts of climate change, 
identifying critical changes to policy needed to move towards a low carbon economy. 
Arguing that action needs to be taken now, given the long lead-in times before benefits 
materialize, Stern estimated that tackling climate change now would cost 1% of global 
GDP per year, compared to losing 5% of global GDP per year by 2050 if no action were 
taken. 
 
One of the more controversial of Stern’s recommendations was that early emissions 
reductions, should not come generally from transport, but from elsewhere – notably 
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industry and the housing stock – where they can be “bought” more cost-effectively. The 
report concludes that a more meaningful transport contribution to the target of 60% 
reduction in carbon emissions by 2050 should come in the second half of the period. 
While precise answers on marginal abatement costs within and between sectors must 
await the work of the Climate Change Commission, Stern acknowledges that strong 
price signals and technological improvements need to be locked in early, otherwise 
there will be a very large gap indeed between ‘business as usual’ and ‘efficient 
contribution’ scenarios. 
 
The Eddington Study focused on transport’s role in supporting the economy, particularly 
the urban economy where recent growth has been strongest (PARKINSON et al., 
2004). The report argues that transport supports clusters and agglomerations of 
economic activity, expanding labour market catchment areas, improving job matching, 
increasing labour market flexibility and facilitating business-to-business interaction. 
Eddington argued that transport’s contribution to these lubricating mechanisms is most 
significant within large high productivity urban areas, and he therefore advocated a re-
ordering of transport sector priorities in favour of the major city regions, and cautioned 
against speculative investment to try to inspire such growth in other areas (DOCHERTY 
et al., 2008). 
 
In terms of policy development and implementation, in one of the report’s widely-quoted 
(and somewhat ambitious) passages, Eddington recommended that government adopt 
a “sophisticated policy mix” of infrastructure investment, making better use of existing 
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infrastructure, and incorporating better estimation of externalities – especially 
agglomeration benefits – into project appraisal. He also recommended caution with 
respect to untested technologies, and advised that large, speculative schemes were 
unlikely to be priorities since there is little convincing evidence that transport can 
fundamentally reorder the geography of the economy. In light of this, the study drew 
attention to the relatively high benefit:cost ratios attached to transport schemes and 
showed that smaller schemes (less than £1bn) tended to offer the highest returns. 
 
These influential studies, though coming from different perspectives, share some 
common features. Both stress the importance of the external effects of transport 
decisions —environmental (Stern) and classic external economies (Eddington). Also 
apparent, particularly in Eddington, is the interplay between transport and spatial 
organisation. Given the uncertainty over whether low carbon vehicles (such as 
hydrogen-powered “eco-cars” (BANISTER, 2000)) will become commonplace in the 
medium term, it is reasonable to conjecture that a substantial part of the burden of 
transport sector adjustment to a lower carbon future will turn out to be borne through 
spatial and behavioural change, relating to where our homes, workplaces, education, 
health, shopping and leisure activities are located, rather than (just) how we travel 
between fixed locations. 
 
Faced with such a scenario, a purist economist might say ‘Get the prices right and the 
responses will look after themselves’. Price is an important instrument, but in the 
presence of myriad economic, environmental and social externalities, the concept of the 
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setting the ‘right’ price for an intermediate good such as transport is an extremely 
complex one. Moreover, there are numerous political and practical difficulties in relying 
mainly on pricing for demand management, as has been illustrated by the 
Government’s at best lukewarm position on network road user charging in its response 
to Eddington (DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT (DfT), 2007). 
 
Our reading of the Stern and Eddington reports is therefore that they imply a need for 
an enhanced and more interventionist planning system to act as a (partial) surrogate for 
pricing, and to buttress market forces in the early stages of Stern’s graduated approach 
to reducing emissions. Continued investment in transport infrastructure will be required 
to resolve (or at least remediate) particularly acute congestion or capacity problems that 
are spatially or temporally concentrated in their nature. Some sort of demand 
management will be necessary if any meaningful degree of sustainability is to be 
attained, since technology alone will not solve the problem. 
 
Against this background it is interesting to consider the stance taken by another of the 
Treasury’s independent reviews - the Barker Review of Land Use Planning (2006), and 
the Department for Communities and Local Government’s (DCLG) subsequent Planning 
White Paper, Planning for a Sustainable Future (DCLG, 2007). The Barker Review of 
Planning was commissioned in 2005 by the then Chancellor and Deputy Prime Minister 
to consider how planning policy might help deliver better economic growth and national 
competitiveness in the context of unfolding globalisation. One of the Review’s main 
recommendations – that the planning system needs to be streamlined in operational 
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terms, so that there is better proportionality in terms of the bureaucracy associated with 
different kinds of development – is largely uncontroversial. 
 
Barker’s second set of recommendations has generated much more critique and 
debate, however. The Review’s proposals that strategic land use policy be liberalised, in 
particular that the ‘needs’ test for commercial development be removed, risk making it 
much more difficult to develop settlement patterns and urban forms that reduce the 
need to travel, and which can be easily served by public transport (COMMISSION FOR 
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT (CfIT, 2006). Indeed, Kate Barker herself admitted that 
she has since “rethought” this aspect of her report in the light of these criticisms 
(NIVEN, 2007). 
 
Planning For a Sustainable Future is strongly influenced by Barker, setting out a range 
of proposals to streamline the planning process in England, and to move it towards a 
more proactive, development-enabling mindset. Published in May 2007, the White 
Paper is in the vanguard of the ‘new’ agenda for the future strategic planning and 
development policy. Strongly focused on the idea that the planning system can be a 
proactive tool to stimulate and manage sustainable economic growth, the White Paper 
is rooted in the established competitiveness paradigm (BEGG, 2001), and seeks to 
rationalise how enhanced economic growth can be achieved in an era of (significantly) 
reduced carbon emissions. 
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However, we are concerned that there is a disconnect between Barker’s original report 
and the subsequent White Paper with their deregulatory flavour, and the Stern and 
Eddington Reviews which propose a range of ‘smarter’ market interventions to tackle 
difficult transport policy problems. The purpose of this article is therefore to explore this 
apparent contradiction between different strands of top-level government strategic 
thinking, and to outline how these might be mediated. We focus on England because 
the majority of the proposals in the Planning White Paper relate to this jurisdictioni, 
planning being a wholly devolved matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland. (For more on 
the different trajectories of planning and related policies such as transport, see 
MACKINNON et al., 2008). 
 
In the next section of the paper, we discuss the demographic and spatial forecasts and 
assumptions used in the planning White Paper and their consequences for land use 
planning and transport. We then turn to the micro-level question of the criteria for 
planning approval/consent, and how these might impact on the inherent sustainability of 
future places, before going on to discuss the proposed changes to the planning system 
itself as it relates to transport. Finally, we attempt a synthesis of the issues raised, 
noting some important implications for public policy. 
 
 
Macro-economic and demographic assumptions 
The planning White Paper adopts a particular outlook on the future, especially long-
range economic and demographic trends, of which the most important are growing 
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population, increased levels of GDP per capita, reduced average household size, and 
continued net migration for the north to the south of the UK. Alternative futures such as 
those with different politico-socio-economic drivers, or in which emissions reduction 
takes even higher policy priority are not addressed in any meaningful way. It is this 
‘locking-in’ of the planning agenda to a particular future scenario based on a set of trend 
forecasts that poses the biggest challenge for transport since implementing effective 
transport policies to support a sustainable economy within a ‘business as usual’ spatial 
strategy might be very difficult indeed. There are several policy questions arising from 
this, which in our view, are not answered by Barker and the White Paper and require 
further examination. 
 
Is the predict-and-provide approach to housing growth compatible with the looming 
realities of carbon constraint and climate change? 
Perhaps the single most important set of (implicit) assumptions in the White Paper is 
that the current macro-level trends in terms of the geographical structure of the 
English/UK economy will continue (or indeed, accelerate). These assumptions can be 
summarised thus: 
 
• There will continue to be a significant net increase in England’s total population 
with net international in-migration a significant component of this; 
 
• Net north-south movements in population will continue, especially in response to 
increasing demand for labour in the south; 
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• Household structure will continue to change, with a reduction in the average size 
of households, and hence an increase in the overall number of households in the 
country (see Table 1 below). 
 
<< Table 1 here >> 
 
These assumptions represent a clear read across from Barker in terms of the presumed 
future demand for land and especially housing, since the key aim of the White Paper is 
to make the release of development land ‘easier’ by relaxing planning consent criteria 
and shaking up the bureaucracy of the planning system so that the land market 
becomes more responsive to demand. However, this risks something of a ‘predict and 
provide’ approach to strategic planning, since the White Paper simply takes the 
previous government forecasts used by Barker and looks at the way in which these 
might be implemented, without challenging the forecasts themselves. 
 
The first key issue to emerge from this analysis is therefore the importance of active 
versus passive policymaking. The White Paper relies on the forecasts used by Barker, 
and does not pose the critical questions of whether current trends are inevitable or 
desirable, and whether policy might seeks to intervene to change these trends. This is 
especially important given Stern’s call for precisely this kind of active approach to 
significantly influence the future level of carbon emissions. Key factors at play behind 
these questions (see WENBAN-SMITH, 2006) include the marginal social overhead 
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capital costs (electricity, transport, water) in different locations; the availability of suitable 
land and the extent of the engineering required to release it (flood protection etc.); the 
real extent of the agglomeration economies (explored at length in the research annexes 
to the Eddington report – see GRAHAM, 2006); and the wider social benefit:cost 
implications benefit of (re)locating hundreds of thousands of people in the London 
commuter belt versus the north/west midlands.  
 
The White Paper’s assumptions suggest that regional policy – strategic planning of how 
the level of economic activity and population should be distributed between regions – 
will remain an important area for debate in England, especially given the significant 
differentials in economic performance between regions (Figure 1). The UK 
Government’s view can be characterised as the belief that regional policy is at best a 
zero sum game in which public resources are used to redistribute growth rather than 
increasing the level of growth of the country as a whole; indeed active decentralisation 
away from London and the south east might even put the future competitiveness of 
what SEEDA calls England’s only “world class region” (MUSSON et al., 2002) at risk. It 
is clear that the devolved administrations do not necessarily believe this to be the case, 
however – witness the Scottish Government’s ‘National Purpose’ of raising Scotland’s 
rate of economic growth to first match and then exceed that of the UK (SCOTTISH 
GOVERNMENT, 2007). 
 
<<Figure 1 Here >> 
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Yet there are strategic spatial planning options open to the UK Government that provide 
an alternative approach to accommodating a resilient north-south divide in England 
(ATHEY et al., 2007). Two more independent Treasury reviews, those of Lyons on local 
government (2003) and Gershon on the efficiency of public spending (2004) have noted 
the potential for decentralisation of government and public sector employment to 
stimulate economic growth in other core cities. Indeed, there has been a range of 
academic research arguing that it is necessary to embark on much more far reaching 
decentralisation than has been achieved to date if the north-south productivity gap is to 
be closed (see, for example, AMIN et al., 2003; AMIN, 2004). 
 
An important and as yet under-researched question is therefore ‘what regional policy 
approach would most closely align strategic planning to the post Stern, world?’ 
Evidence from elsewhere (see, for example, ROBSON AND DEAS (2001) for a 
comparison of the English and French experience of decentralisation) suggests that 
stronger regional centres could have an important role to play. Especially as London is 
experiencing a record exodus of people (CHAMPION, 2006), balanced only by strong 
(international) in-migration, the concerted building up of large regional cities in the 
midlands and north could be an important policy objective; at the very least this 
proposition should be tested, since the substantial recent regeneration activity in the 
larger cities provides potential to align planning objectives for the future with current 
market trends (JOHNSON et al., 2007). 
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How do different strategies for accommodating growth compare in terms of their costs 
and benefits, e.g. marginal growth of existing towns or a few new cities? 
Whatever decision is made about the top level distribution of jobs and people between 
regions, a second set of assumptions governs how settlements themselves should be 
planned to accommodate growth. One of the key areas of mismatch between the 
planning White Paper and the Barker analysis on which it is largely based is urban 
deconcentration. Barring very significant changes in the price of energy (which is 
possible), the more liberal land markets assumed by the White Paper will almost 
inevitably encourage the deconcentration of development, given the realities of land 
supply and the fact that brownfield land is generally more expensive to remediate. 
Eddington and Stern, on the other hand, both argue for reintensification of development; 
Eddington from the economic viewpoint that economies of agglomeration are becoming 
more important, and that the impacts of transport investment higher in large 
agglomerations (GRAHAM, 2006); whilst Stern’s broader outlooks reflects previous 
policies on reducing the need to travel through higher density of population and 
economic activity. 
 
This apparent mismatch leads us to identify a second set of assumptions implicit in the 
White Paper, this time concerning links between transport and the economy: 
 
• that transport intensity in the economy, i.e. person km per unit GVA growth, will 
stay around its stable historic level of approximately 1:1; 
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• therefore that the total demand for travel will not be decoupled from economic 
growth, and so overall transport demand will continue to rise, and even 
accelerate should long term economic growth increase. 
 
Clearly, these two positions are at odds with Stern (barring a transformation away from 
carbon-dependent transport technology – see BANISTER (2000) for one such 
scenario), and potentially at odds with Eddington’s recommendations assuming that 
increased travel demand cannot be met by expanded transport capacity. They also 
(again) fail to recognise a number of important changes in these relationships that could 
emerge either from external factor conditions, or from policy interventions. As well as 
significantly higher energy prices, other external factors could include the longer term 
impact of ICT on location and transport choices, the changing structure of the labour 
market in terms of the proportion of full time, single location jobs; the overall number of 
economically active people, and the changing travel demands of an ageing population.  
 
It is the mix of these factors that will determine which type of settlement form and urban 
hierarchy is the most transport- and energy efficient in future. There has been 
substantial debate about the ‘best’ form of urban structure, with most attention focused 
on Peter Hall’s notion of a ‘dispersed concentration’ model of intensified towns located 
on key growth corridors to/from London, or the other largest cities. However, this idea is 
relatively old (it has its roots in the new towns movement and, at a larger scale, the 
growth poles strategy for Greater Paris in the 1960s and 70s), and therefore is based on 
a set of assumptions focused on the 20th century economy. In his most recent work, 
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Peter Hall himself notes that it is time to update the idea according to the imperative of 
addressing emissions and climate change (HALL, 2007), although other research has 
claimed the dispersed concentration might actually increase travel and energy 
consumption (HOLDEN AND NORLAND, 2005). There is clearly work to be done in 
updating the research base about the economic, transport and environmental 
performance of different settlement forms. 
 
 
What are the relative benefits of (a) constraining existing urban boundaries with green 
belt and causing “leapfrogging” journeys and (b) extending the urban areas? 
The planning White Paper itself claims that the government has “been able to achieve a 
substantial increase in new house building to help meet growing demand while 
minimising urban sprawl and maximising the use of brownfield land” through its ‘town 
centres first approach’. Whilst maximising the reuse of brownfield land development is 
generally helpful in transport terms, since such land tends to be in reasonable proximity 
to existing infrastructure and economic nodesii, the degree of success attained is 
dependent on the wider spatial structure of the economy. 
 
Reinvigorating town centres linked to the prioritisation of brownfield sites is one means 
of encouraging shorter journeys (especially) commuting and subsistence shopping, 
compared to developing the urban fringe. However, this traditional approach in itself 
relies on a number of assumed objectives, which may well be out of date given wider 
structural changes in the economy. Most important is the objective to enable people to 
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live closer to their place of work in order to reduce the demand for commuting. Given 
the increasing churn in the labour market, even if people make a decision to locate near 
a particular job, this situation is increasingly less likely to last. This means that the 
traditional notion of ‘self contained’ communities, in which people can access all of the 
employment and other services that they consume regularly within a single settlement is 
illusory (BREHENY, 1995; 1999). Indeed, even less self-containment might be expected 
in future if the numbers of people holding more than one job, or engaged in activities 
that depend on complex patterns of face-to-face business interaction, continue to 
increase. 
 
Notwithstanding changing labour market economics, the extent to which the compact 
city model of dense, mixed use places in which the demand for travel is minimised can 
be achieved in practice is contested. Even in London, with very high densities and 
agglomerations of people, jobs and transport links in the central core, it is the suburbs 
that are leading jobs and population growth. Therefore, strongly constraining the 
physical footprint of the city – whilst intuitively attractive in terms of its potential to 
reintensify land uses and help reduce the need for travel – does not in itself guarantee 
more transport and energy efficient organisation of the economy (ANDERSON et al., 
1996; BANISTER et al., 1997; BREHENY, 1995). This uncertainty, amplified by the 
issues of long run energy prices, climate change and carbon reduction, suggests that 
some sort of scenario modelling is required to try and improve our understanding of the 
impacts of different settlement structures in practice. 
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An acid test of a pro-active transport planning policy could be the proposed High Speed 
Rail line from London to the north. It would be possible to view this narrowly, as a 
transport project. But, conceptually, such a line, as well as contributing to modal shift for 
long distance trips, could improve the combined economic performance of London, west 
midlands and the Transpennine region, provided that concerted property development 
and planning efforts are made in the provincial cities concerned to capture the benefits 
and avoid reinforcing economic activity in London (see VICKERMAN, 1997 and PUGA, 
2002 for analysis of these competing outcomes; also BONNAFOUS, 1987 for more on 
these issues in the context of France). It could also provide, as a counterpart to 
Ebbsfleet, the trunk connector for a new city to the north west of London in the Bicester 
– Milton Keynes corridor. It may be that radial commuting journeys into London become 
longer on average, ‘leapfrogging’ more of the green belt, but that other journeys in 
compact purpose-built centres might be shorter and/or by more sustainable modes in 
compensation, with a more sustainable energy consumption and emissions profile 
overall. A more holistic way of considering such opportunities is called for than the 
approach taken in the White Paper, and represents a further domain in which new 
research is urgently required (ROYAL TOWN PLANNING INSTITUTE 2007).  
 
<< Figure 2 here>> 
 
<< Figure 3 here>> 
 
 
 18 
Criteria for planning approval 
One of the pieces of mood music in the Barker report is the leaning towards ‘positive 
planning’. According to the report, the planning system should not be asked to bear a 
disproportionate share of the overall burden of response to climate change; other 
policies such as pricing may be more efficient and effective. More generally, planning 
should be reformed so that it is  
 
‘based on the consideration of spillover effects, rather than trying to predict 
market demand. Planners should not be attempting to determine if there is 
sufficient ‘need’ for a given application – rather the applicant, who is bearing the 
risks, should be responsible for assessing that likely demand is sufficient to make 
the development viable.’ 
 
(BARKER, 2006:7). 
 
In a competitive market economy, such an approach might seem natural, but in practice 
a lot depends on interpretation. Consider first the case of a piece of privately provided 
transport infrastructure such as an airport development. It has been argued at inquiry on 
behalf of promoters, so far unsuccessfully, that market demand is of no concern to the 
planning system and that the terms of reference of the inquiry should be restricted to the 
external costs and benefits, that is, the spillovers. However, in our view, this is too 
restrictive an interpretation of the public interest. Firstly, there may be a national airports 
policy to consider with which the application may or may not be consistent. Secondly 
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there may be issues of abstraction of traffic from other airports to consider. Thirdly, and 
most important, it may be impossible to judge the overall social advantage unless the 
benefits and costs to the airport, airline and traveller system are admitted in evidence. 
How are the spillovers from the infrastructure improvement to environmental impact to 
be assessed without robust evidence on the direct impacts? Overall, there is a lot to be 
said for planning decisions relating to transport infrastructure to be assessed on the 
basis of a comprehensive framework such as The New Approach to Appraisal (NATA), 
and not restricted to an analysis of the spillovers. 
 
A second example concerns the proposed removal of the ‘need’ criterion from the local 
planning process. This creates one of the most apparent sources of tension between 
the Planning White Paper and the Stern and Eddington analyses. The Barker Report 
(para 1.32) says 
 
‘The town centre policy is – rightly – an important priority for Government. It helps 
to promote the vitality and viability of town centres which brings a number of 
benefits. It is therefore important to assess the potential impact on the town 
centre of new development proposed beyond its borders. The sequential and 
impact tests have rules to play here and should be maintained. But… it is not 
appropriate to turn down applications on the basis of there being no need.’ 
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The virtues of the proposal are clear – promote retail competition, reduce margins and 
cut location rents (see para 1.36 and footnote 36). However, from a transport sector 
point of view there are some difficult issues to consider: 
 
• Spillovers between developments and the highway system. Consider the case of 
a Highways Agency ring road around a town, with a proposal for development 
close to the junction between a main town radial and the ring road. While it is 
clear that no single Agency should be in the position of having a veto on the 
scheme, some important questions need to be addressed.  Are the traffic 
congestion effects relevant spillovers for the inquiry?  Should the HA/LA be 
permitted to recover the costs of increased congestion as well as the costs of 
ancillary infrastructure through the relevant Section 52/106 agreements? Should 
an access charge regime be introduced? What should the compensation costs 
be, especially in the case where expanding road capacity is infeasible? 
 
• Spillovers between the out of town development and the town centre. Plausibly, a 
new development will take market share from existing shops in some 
monopolistic competition type of way, with consequences for car users (does 
mean trip length rise or fall?) and for public transport users (does the town centre 
go into decline and what are their alternatives?). 
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The issues arising from these considerations are in a sense obvious, especially the core 
question of the extent to which it is the role of the planning system to look on a wider 
(Stern Report) basis with a longer timescale and a lower discount rate than commercial 
decision-makers would normally use. If the answer to this is ‘yes’ – and we would say 
that it is – further questions then arise. Should settlements therefore be designed in 
such a way that they anticipate a lower carbon future? Should significant development 
proposals be required to submit a carbon balance sheet and/or use the Government’s 
shadow price of carbon (DEPARTMENT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND 
RURAL AFFAIRS (DEFRA, 2007) Does the Barker notion of spillovers extend this far? 
Note that this would not necessarily exclude ‘out of town’ developments, but it would 
suggest the need for something more like a planning balance sheet or extended CBA 
assessment framework for major developments than is implied by Barker. In the 
absence of full internalisation through compensation for spillovers, it is not possible to 
reach balanced decisions without considering the “value” of – as opposed to “need for” 
– the development. Aligning development incentives with the negotiation between these 
different objectives – in other words our best estimate of the overall public good – will 
become even more important in future if public capital for new infrastructure continues 
to be strongly rationed as has been the case in the UK for several decades, and as 
climate change and emissions reduction assume ever more important roles in broader 
policy. A carbon balance sheet approach would expose any proposed development to 
the acid test of whether it is merely redistributing existing activity to new locations as 
opposed to generating genuinely new, sustainable growth. 
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The underlying research question to all of this discussion is therefore – given the Stern 
agenda and recent Government statements, “what will the layout of (English) towns and 
cities need to look like in a low carbon future, and what supporting transport and 
planning measures will push the system in the right direction? To view the planning 
system as accounting for spillovers while otherwise validating what the market would 
predict and provide seems to us a rather simplistic and anachronistic concept: surely it 
is time to point out the deficiencies is arguments such as those made by Ikea UK that 
planning bureaucracy is “a barrier and not in consumers’ interests” and that “retailers 
have different formats and concepts and regulations should be sympathetic to this” 
(Høgsted, 2006)?iii. 
 
 
The proposed changes to the planning process 
The Barker Review also identifies a need for a clearer policy framework within which 
planning applications and consents for major infrastructure can move forward. It argues 
that the government should draw up a Statement of Strategic Objectives (SSO) for 
major infrastructure, which would, where appropriate and possible, be spatially specific 
and would provide a clearer spatial framework to aid decision-making for major 
infrastructure. An independent Planning Commission would be charged with assessing 
applications against this strategic framework alongside other considerations such as 
local impacts. The Planning Commission would in effect combine the functions of the 
Public Inquiry (or Parliamentary Bill procedure) and the Secretary of State’s decision 
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stage for projects of national importance. There would be no change at this point to 
Ministerial powers to call in and decide appeals from local Planning Inquiries. 
 
The proposals, which effectively split the planning processes for major infrastructure 
developments into two stages – the SSO stage and the Planning Commission stage – 
could work well for the largest projects, such as new airport runways and terminals, 
deep water ports or high speed rail lines. The SSO stage would incorporate public 
consultation and (if a project were successful) culminate in a Statement certifying the 
national need for a project, and probably that the need is best met by a particular project 
option; this process is very similar to the French concept of the Déclaration d’Utilité 
Publique (Declaration of Public Need) upon which policy makers in the UK have often 
looked jealously given its track record in streamlining the development process for 
major infrastructure schemes such as the network of TGV lines. 
 
Despite its immediate attractions, there remain many issues to be resolved about how 
such a system would operate, especially around the rules of evidence and 
representation, the transparency with which the Statement was determined and whether 
the Statement would be open to Parliamentary scrutiny. These, and other question 
marks of the composition, operation and powers of the Planning Commission, highlight 
the fundamental issue of the legitimacy of the new system. Would a Ministerially 
appointed quango be seen as genuinely independent? Under what circumstances could 
the Planning Commission reject a scheme? Should not elected government ministers 
retain unambiguous final determination on planning matters? The Barker Report refers 
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to the case in which the local costs are found to outweigh the national benefits, but 
could not the Commission discover new facts relating to the national case? Could it 
decide that Ministers had mis-advised themselves in authorising the SSO for the 
scheme, or that circumstances had changed significantly since the SSO? It is not 
difficult to imagine these boundaries being fertile territory for judicial review. Perhaps 
this lies behind more rethinking, this time that of the government rather than Barker: 
 
“We have also concluded that there may be some very exceptional circumstances 
in which it would not be appropriate to leave final decisions to the Commission.” 
 
(DCLG, 2007b:2) 
 
A second issue, in the context of transport, is the definition of ‘major’ infrastructure. 
While this is not a big problem for airports or ports (though even here the chosen 
thresholds are debateable) it is not at all straightforward for road and rail infrastructure. 
No threshold has yet been proposed for rail schemes, which is remarkable given the 
complexity of the rail network and the extent to which relatively minor, local changes in 
one part of the country can have very significant impacts hundreds of miles away – 
consider the example of relatively short journeys such as Leeds – Sheffield which rely 
on long distance trains for a large part of their service pattern. The illustrative roads 
threshold in the White Paper is ‘schemes on or adding to the Strategic Road Network 
requiring land outside of the existing highway boundary; this would be subject to further 
definition in the relevant national policy statement’.  
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As a set of criteria for eligibility under the new process, the government’s proposals 
seem rather odd, given that the definition of what counts as ‘major’ rests on who the 
project sponsor is, what powers they possess and the binary yes/no approach to the 
additional land take of the project. This immediately suggests some glaring anomalies - 
how can it be the case that large urban schemes such as Light Rapid Transit routes or 
Road User Charging with big land use consequences do not class as major, nor do 
motorway widening schemes within the envelope of the existing road, while local by-
passes or realignments on the Strategic Road Network do? 
 
Taking as an example a typical smaller HA scheme, the Temple Sowerby by-pass on 
the A66, it is difficult to believe that splitting the process between the SSO and the 
Planning Commission would be helpful. In order to determine the SSO, it would be 
necessary to complete the NATA table and Environmental Statement, which implies 
determining the need for the road, its horizontal and vertical alignment, junction layouts 
and environmental design. What else is left for the Planning Commission? 
 
In addition to these essentially pragmatic arguments, there are issues of democratic 
accountability. The local Public Inquiry is in part a social safety valve. It is not desirable 
to return to the position of the early 1970s when the need for highway schemes was 
outside the remit of the Inquiry. Whether it is achieved at the SSO stage or at the 
Planning Commission stage, there must be a clear forum within which to lay out what 
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the scheme is, what options have been considered, and to debate whether the scheme 
is in the public interest which must include the need for/value of the scheme. 
 
Finally, we do wonder how much delay is genuinely due to the Public Inquiry and 
Secretary of State decision stages of the planning process. It would be an interesting 
piece of work to take a sample of transport schemes such as Thameslink 2000, M1 J6-
10 widening, M6 Carlisle-Guardsmill extension, A628 Mottram-Tintwistle and analyse 
the entire project planning cycle. The mega projects cited in Table 2 of Barker’s interim 
report are not typical transport schemes. We accept that in the transport sector the PI 
and Ministerial decision process can be a major cause of delay in the case of highly 
controversial schemes (e.g. Thames Gateway Bridge). In such cases, it is well worth 
considering how precisely the proposed Planning Commission would improve the 
process efficiency and/or produce a better result. In any case, our view, subject to 
testing, is that the most usual source of delay at the back end of the planning process 
for typical transport schemes is simply scarcity of public capital creating scheme 
programming delays. 
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Conclusions 
Like the Barker Report before it, the planning White Paper is strongly rooted in a set of 
important macro-assumptions on the future structure of the English/UK economy. A 
somewhat raw vision of deeper globalisation is laid out, with cities and regions exposed 
to stiff competition for footloose investment. Whether globalisation continues to play out 
like this, given both the environmental consequences, and other factors such as 
increasing resistance to international migration and the desire to rediscover 
“authenticity” in terms of distinctive regional identities, economies and products, is far 
from certain (AMIN AND THRIFT, 1994). 
 
In terms of the macro-management of the English economy, this assumption leads to 
the position that growth in the greater south east must be accommodated, since this is 
the only region which is genuinely competitive with other high value, knowledge 
economies elsewhere in Europe and beyond. In turn, this implies continued, or perhaps 
accelerating net North-South movement of people, households and employment for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
This vision gives rise to two critical problems. First, infrastructure in the south east, 
including transport but also other public services from water and drainage to schools 
and healthcare, will not be able to meet this level of increased demand. Second, this 
perspective makes grim reading for much of the North, since outside the regeneration 
success stories of the largest provincial cities such as Manchester and Leeds, it is no 
longer clear what many historic communities are ‘for’ any more; perhaps the most that 
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medium sized former industrial towns  - and some cities – in the North and Midlands 
can hope for is managed decline. 
 
Even assuming that government is content with this situation, the pressures created by 
the need to accommodate millions of new people and households in the greater south 
east are very significant: the White Paper’s aspiration to streamline the planning system 
and reduce the time taken for projects to move from inception to delivery is clearly 
based on the view that the pace of development in the south east will need to increase if 
the region (and therefore England/UK) is to remain competitive. Although approaching a 
different set of issues Eddington agrees on this point, arguing that even if substantially 
greater funding was available for new transport infrastructure, the planning system 
would find it difficult to deliver in a realistic timescale. 
 
The tension between the White Paper and Eddington’s analysis is perhaps best 
illustrated in the difference in their fundamental approach to public intervention. The 
planning White Paper is strongly focused on reducing the impact of the planning system 
itself, both in terms of the restrictions placed on potential development by the concept of 
‘need’, and on the time it takes to actually process planning applications. In general 
terms, the White Paper could therefore be read as promoting a substantial liberalisation 
of planning and in turn the land market, which is entirely consistent with Barker’s 
understanding of globalisation and competitiveness, and the increased demand she 
identifies for flexible responses to footloose development opportunities if they are not to 
be lost to other (foreign) locations. 
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In contrast, in recommending a “sophisticated policy mix” of investment according to 
improved appraisal rules and the pricing of scarce assets (i.e. road space), Eddington 
was arguing for quite complex policy intervention as the key to securing better economic 
efficiency. Another difference is in their attitudes to small, incremental developments: 
Eddington explains how a set of smaller interventions can often have a (much) greater 
overall cumulative impact on economic performance than large, ‘showpiece’ schemes. 
Yet the planning White Paper contradicts this, not just by its focus on streamlining the 
planning process for the delivery of the largest projects, but by recommending that 
many smaller, individual schemes (mostly those at the level of individual private 
dwellings) be taken outside the planning control environment altogether. This is clearly 
problematic given the cumulative impact of many small decisions in concert with one 
another, as Eddington pointed out. 
 
The potential mismatches between the White Paper and the Stern report are even 
greater. Stern examined the economic impacts of climate change and the policy 
principles needed to move to a low carbon economy.  Given the likelihood that fossil 
fuels will continue to dominate transport energy sources at least over the medium term, 
Stern recognised that carbon reduction could be more easily ‘bought’ from other 
sectors, particularly industry, generation and domestic use. However, Stern also 
(implicitly) predicts a substantial increase in the real price of energy, which will have 
important consequences for energy intensive goods, including transport, and for 
location choices as a result. 
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There are therefore two important specific issues arising from this. The White Paper 
assumes that the key to maximising national competitiveness is accommodating the 
macro socio-economic and locational trends of net North-South movement by a 
dispersed pattern of land use across the greater south east. However, the constraints 
placed on transport costs and infrastructure availability do not need to be particularly 
strong to make it difficult if not impossible to deliver this vision. 
 
The second important factor is the White Paper’s love of the new. By planning for 
substantial new build – especially of housing – and focusing on this new stock as a 
means to reduce overall carbon emissions from domestic sources, there is the 
substantial risk that older areas, many of which but by no means all are in the North, 
might be abandoned to further relative or absolute decline. This has clear transport 
impacts given the availability of existing infrastructure in these areas, compared to the 
requirement to build roads and public transport systems from scratch in zones of new 
development. 
 
Our overall view is therefore that Stern and Eddington make uncomfortable reading for 
the UK Government. Global economic and environmental conditions pose big 
questions, including: 
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• Is it better to focus infrastructure resources on one ‘world class’ region or 
build up other Metropolitan Areas as counterweights in the model of many 
continental countries?; 
• Within the big cities, how best can land use and transport be organised to 
deliver what is needed in terms of efficiency, equity and environmental 
performance?; 
• What mix of new build, rebuild, high and medium density, brownfield and 
greenfield development is needed?; 
• What the respective roles of planning and market forces are in pushing the 
land market and wider economy in the ‘right’ direction for decarbonsation?. 
 
Within that context, the White Paper’s approach is misguided, and its title ‘Planning for a 
Sustainable Future’ more than a little hubristic. Planning can no longer be only about 
the use of land; it needs to be about the spatial organisation of resources in pursuit of 
more carbon-efficient development in a post-Stern world. Planning cannot supplant the 
market but it must complement it if stated environmental policy objectives are to be met. 
Above all, planning is the mechanism by which society is empowered to take the long 
view. 
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Table 1: Household projections by region 
 
Region Number of 
households  
 2003  
Number of 
households 
2021 
Number of 
households 
2026 
Average 
annual 
change 
2003 - 2026 
North East  1,088,000  1,194,000 1,211,000  5,300 
North West  2,847,000  3,290,000  3,378,000  21,900 
Yorkshire and 
the Humber  
2,104,000  2,437,000  2,511,000  17,700 
East Midlands  1,782,000  2,146,000  2,230,000  19,500 
West Midlands  2,193,000  2,526,000  2,602,000  17,800 
East 2,286,000  2,797,000  2,926,000  27,800 
London  3,093,000 3,756,000 3,926,000 36,200 
South East 3,348,000 4,013,000 4,184,000 36,300 
South West 2,137,000 2,622,000 2,745,000 26,400 
England 20,904,000  24,781,000  25,713,000  209,000  
 
Source: DCLG (2007). 
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Figure 1 Gross Value Added per capita for UK nations and regions, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Statistics, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_economy/Regional_GVA_Decemb
er_2007.pdf 
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Figure 2 Indicative North-South high speed rail route. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Greengauge 21 (2007) High Speed Two – A Greengauge 21 Proposition. 
 http://www.greengauge21.net/assets/GG21_HS2.pdf 
 41 
Figure 3 Indicative high speed rail network for south eastern England 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Greengauge 21 (2007) High Speed Two – A Greengauge 21 Proposition. 
 http://www.greengauge21.net/assets/GG21_HS2.pdf 
 
 
 42 
Endnotes 
                                                          
i Although the proposals for new approval processes for major infrastructure 
development in the Planning White Paper (and subsequent Planning Bill) also apply to 
Wales, most of the discussion in the White Paper is on reform of the planning system in 
England.  
 
ii That said, many of the largest brownfield plots, such as the disused military and health 
sites identified by the government in its preamble to its legislation on housing introduced 
to parliament on 11 July 2007, are detached from existing settlements and transport 
links. 
 
iii Also note that Marks and Spencer’s much vaunted ‘Plan A’ for carbon neutrality does 
not include the transport-derived emissions of customers’ trips to and from the 
company’s stores (see Docherty and Shaw, 2008). 
 
iv The apparent typographical error in this URL should be ignored 
